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NOTES AND COMMENTS

on a false picture, when the truth is before it, though from the lips of
one witness rather than from another, is to depart from that concept.
Our court has never done so.
Hence, it appears that the 'decision in the Atkins case is correct.
Furthermore, the Bar should welcome the distinctions laid down therein
as guides for the consideration of this all-important problem.
CECIL

J. HILL.

Negligence-Rescue-Aid to Victim After Accident as Rescue*
The plaintiff alleged that he was at home in bed and heard his
ambulance passing on its way to deliver a patient to the hospital. Subsequently a loud crash was heard and the siren stopped blowing. Plaintiff, realizing that his ambulance had collided with something at a nearby
intersection, got up and rushed to the scene of the accident, where he
found that it had been struck by a gasoline truck due to the negligence
of defendant in parking its truck so as to obstruct the view of the intersection. It was bitter cold; and several persons, either wounded or
dead, were lying on the ground. The peril of the wounded being obvious, the plaintiff determined to dispatch them to the hospital; and, in
his attempt to aid in lifting them into another ambulance, he overexerted himself causing the injury complained of. Upon demurrer it
was held that the petition set forth a cause of action for damages resulting from the injuries received in the attempted rescue, the court
stating that if defendant injured a person by negligence someone might'
reasonably be expected to come to his aid, and that it was of no moment by what circumstances the rescuer appeared on the scene.1 The
dissenting judge strongly argued that the injury to the plaintiff was too
negligence of 'defendant in parkremote to be predicated on the alleged
2
ing its truck in this illegal manner.
It is generally held that when a person is exposed to imminent peril
of life or limb, through the negligent act of another, the latter will be
liable in damages for the injuries sustained by a third party in a reasonable effort to rescue the one so imperiled,3 the rescuer not being
* The scope of this note is limited to those cases in .which a human being is
imperiled, purposely excluding those cases dealing with the, jeopardizing of
property.
, 32 S. E. (2d) 420
Ga. App. 'Blanchard v. Reliable Transfer Co., (1944).
, 32 S. E. (2d) at 423 (dissenting opinion).
' Cote v. Palmer et al., 127 Conn. 321, 16 A. (2d) 595 (1940) ; Taylor Coal Co.
v. Porter's Adm'r., 164 Ky. 523, 175 S. W. 1014 (1915) ; Hatch v. Globe Laundry
2See id. at -

Co., 137 Me. 379, 171 Atl. 387 (1934); Dixon v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co., 207
Mass. 126, 92 N. E. 1030 (1910) ; Eckert v. Long Island Ry. Co., 43 N. Y. 502,
3 Am. Rep. 72 (1871) ; Norris v. Atl. Coast Line Ry. Co., 152 N. C. 505, 67 S. E.
1017, 27 L. R. A. (N.s.) 1069 (1910) (This case is seemingly the sole authority
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precluded from recovery because of his apparent immunity from danger
or his voluntary incurrence of risk,4 provided his acts do not constitute
contributory negligence, as beivg rash and reckless in the minds of men
of ordinary prudence acting in emergency."* If the rescuer were required to stop and weigh the danger, and compare it with that "overhanging" the person in peril, it would be tantamount to a denial of the
right to rescue altogether where the peril is imminent. Therefore, under
the "rescue doctrine," where human life is involved, a liberal rule prevails with relation to the contributory negligence of the rescuer. Under
such rule the conduct of the rescuer is not limited, or subjected, to the
same exacting rules which obtain under ordinary conditions, and a mere
lack of judgment under such circumstances cannot be regarded as
negligence on his part.*
If the peril is such as to justify an ordinarily prudent person in taking the risk, the negligent party must answer for his breach of duty
in North Carolina.); Ridley v. Mobile & 0. R. Co., 114 Tenn. 727, 86 S. W. 606
(1905) ; Shultz et al. v. Dallas Power & Light Co., 147 S. W. (2d) 914 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1910) ; Bond v. B. & 0. R. R. C9., 82 W. Va. 557, 96 S. E. 932, 5 A. L. R.
201 (1918).
'Bond v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., 82 W. Va. 557, 96 S. E. 932, 5 A. L. R. 201
(1918).
5
*Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 217 Ala. 251, 115 So. 168 (1928),
cert. grvited, 277 U. S. 579, 48 S. Ct. 436, 72 L. ed. 997 (1928), cert. dismissed,
278 U. S. 576, 49 S. Ct. 95, 73 L. ed. 515 (1928) ; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Orr,
121 Ala. 489, 26 So. 35 (1899); McClure v. Southern Pac. Co., 41 Cal. App. 652,
183 Pac. 248, 249 (1919) ("While concededly deceased could have escaped except
for his efforts to save the life of . . . [the imperiled victim], it is not claimed
that he acted with, . . recklessness .

.

. and it is only in such cases that one, in

attempting to rescue another placed in peril by the negligent act of a third person, can be said to be guilty of contributory negligence.") ; Peyton v. Texas & P.
Ry. Co., 41 La. Ann. 861, 6 So. 690, 17 Am. St. Rep. 430 (1889); Wagner v.
International Ry. Co., 232 N. Y. 176, 180, 133 N. E. 437, 438, 19 A. L. R. 1, 3
(1921) ("The risk of rescue, if only it be not wanton, is born of the occasion.") ;
Eckert v. Long Island Ry. Co., 43 N. Y. 502, 506, 3 Am. Rep. 721, 723 (1871)
("The law has so high a regard for human life that it will not impute negligence
to an effort to preserve it, unless made under such circumstances as to constitute
rashness... .") ; Norris v. Atl. Coast Line Ry. Co., 152 N. C. 505, 67 S. E. 1017,
27 L. R. A. (r. s.) 1069 (1910) ; Shultz et al. v. Dallas Power & Light Co., 147
S. W. (2d) 914 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940); Ridley v. Mobile & 0. R. Co., 114 Tenn.
727, 86 S. W. 606 (1905); Christiansen v. Los Angeles & S. L. R. Co., 77 Utah
85, 291 Pac. 926 (1930).
6*Jones v. Mackay Tel. Cable Co. et al., 137 La. 121, 68 So. 379 (1915);
Hatch v. Globe Laundry Co., 137 Me. 379, 171 Atl. 387 (1934); Linnenhan v,
Sampson, 126 Mass. 506, 30 Am. Rep. 692 (1879) (Mere cowardice and absolute
inaction is not required, but he may take some risks, short of recklessness.) ; Wagner v. International Ry. Co., 232 N. Y. 176, 181, 133 N. E. 437, 438, 19 A. L. R.
1, 4 (1921) ("The law does not discriminate between the rescuer oblivious of peril
and the one who counts the cost. It is enough that the act, whether impulsive or
deliberate, is the child of the occasion.") ; Norris v. Atl. Coast Line Ry. Co., 152
N. C. 505, 514, 67 S. E. 1017, 1021, 27 L. R. A. (x. s.) 1069, 1074 (1910)
(".

.

. he is not required to pause and calculate as to the court decisions, nor

recall the last statute as to the burden of proof, but he is allowed to follow the
promptings of a generous nature and extend the help which the occasion requires. . . .") ; Sarratt et al. v. Holston Quarry Co. of S. C. et al., 174 S. C.
262, 177 S. E. 135 (1934) ; Highland et al. v. Wilsonian Inv. Co., 171 Wash. 34, 17
P. (2d) 631 (1932).
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which is the direct or proximate cause of injuries to the benevolent
actor.7 In order to justify one in risking his life, or serious bodily
injury, in rescuing another person from danger, the danger threatened
must be imminent and real, and not merely imaginary or speculative. 8
However, it is sufficient, if to a reasonably prudent person, the existing
circumstances create the apprehension of danger, even though danger
to a definite person was not actually imminent at the moment.9 In the
application of these rules, to determine whether or not there was negligence on the part of the rescuer, the jury1° * must consider circumstances surrounding the attempt. Among the circumstances to be
considered the following have been stressed by the courts: alarm, excitement, confusion, the promptness required, uncertainty of the means to
be employed, the liability to err in the exercise of judgment, the seriousness and imminence of the danger (both to the person threatened and
the rescuer), the likelihood that harm can be averted, and the close
relationship of blood or affection between the rescuer and the person
imperiled.11 If the jury, upon considering these elements, determines
that the deliverer acted as an ordinarily prudent man under the circumstances, his act will be absolved of the possible taint of rashness,
thus eliminating the question of contributory negligence. Nevertheless,
even if the plaintiff is'at fault, should the defendant be aware of it in
time to avoid injuring him by reasonable diligence, the failure to use
"last clear chance doctrine," to be the
such diligence is held, under the
12
proximate cause of the injury.
To come within the protective measures of this rule, even though
Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 217 Ala. 251, 115 So. 168 (1928);
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Orr, 121 Ala. 489, 26 So. 35 (1899) ; Dixon v. N. Y.,
N. H. & H. R. Co., 207 Mass. 126, 92 N. E. 1031 (1910) ; Brown v. Col. Amuse138
ment Co., 91 Mont. 174, 6 P. (2d) 874 (1932); Wolfinger v. Shaw et ,al.,
Neb. 229, 292 N. W. 731 (1940) ; Eckert v. Long -Island Ry. Co., 43 N. Y. 502, 3
Am. Rep. 721 (1871); Woodward v. Gray, 46 Ohio App. 177, 188 N. E. 304
(1933) (The rule is said to be true regardless of the originof the peril.) ; Ridley
& 0. R. Co., 114 Tenn. 727, 86 S. W. 606 (1905).
v. Mobile
8
Eversole v. Wabash R. Co., 249 Mo. 523, 155 S.W. 419 (1913); Wolfinger
v. Shaw et al., 138 Neb. 229, 292 N. W. 731 (1940) ; Highland v. Wilsonian Inv.
Co., 171 Wash. 34, 17 P. (2d) 631 (1932); cf. Devine v. Pfaelzer, 277 Ill. 255,
115 N. E. 126 (1917) (There must be some one specifically in danger.).

9Ibid.

1o, Okla. Power & Water Co. v. Jamison, 188 Okla. 118, 106 P. (2d) 1097
(1940) (It was there held that the constitutional provision, requiring the defense
of contributory negligence to be a question of fact, prohibited the application of
the "rescue doctrine" in Oklahoma. The court felt that the jury was not to be
limited in its determination of this question by being confined to determining
whether or not the rescuer's act was "rash" or "reckless." This view would appear
to be rather strict, and is peculiar to Oklahoma.).
U'Cote v. Palmer et al., 127 Conn. 321, 16 A. (2d) 595 (1940) ; Bracey et al. v.
Northwestern Improvement Co. et al., 41 Mont. 338, 109 Pac. 706, 137 Am. St.
Rep. 738 (1910); Penna. Co. v. Langendorff, 48 Ohio St. 316, 28 N. E. 172, 13
L. R. A. 190, 29 Am. St. Rep. 553 (1891).
2 The Evansville & Crawfordsville Ry. Co. v. Hiatt, 17 Ind. 102 (1861) ; Jones
v. Mackay Tel. Cable Co. et al., 137 La. 121, 68 So. 379 (1915).
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acting from the most unselfish motives and prompted by the noblest
imptilses, the rescuer must show the negligence of the defendant. The
negligence of the defendant as to the person in danger is negligence with
respect to him who attempts the rescue; but, if defendant is not guilty
of any breach of duty to the imperiled person, he is only liable for
negligence occurring after the rescuer's efforts have commenced.13
Thus in Taylor Coal Co. v. Porter's Adm'r.,14 where plaintiff's intestate, while in the employ of defendant, went to the rescue of the latter's
foreman, who had been overcome by "black damp" in the air shaft of
the defendant's coal mine, it was held that there could be no recovery.
The court stated: "No person who is free from negligence himself can
be made liable in damages on account of injuries sustained by a person
who, at his request, comes to the assistance of one who is in danger
or exposed to peril."' 5 Likewise, in Shultz v. Dallas Power & Light
Co., 6 it was held that there could be no recovery where the plaintiff's
intestate was electrocuted in attempting to' rescue a fellow servant who
was trying to retrieve a hoe, with a discarded wire, from a vault containing the defendant's transformers. It was there said that the mere
fact that no cover was provided for the vault, being otherwise sufficiently protective, was not a showing of negligence on the part of defendant towards either the imperiled party or his would-be rescuer.
In close concert with this situation several cases have presented the
nice question as to whether the deliverer may recover from the delivered, or imperiled party, where the latter has placed himself in peril,
devoid of any wrongful act of a third party. Such recovery is usually
denied on the theory that the individual violates no legal duty by incurring such dangers and risks, no matter how guilty he is morally in
negligently subjecting his own safety to jeopardy. 17* A holding of like
" Taylor Coal Co. v. Porter's Adm'r., 164 Ky. 523, 175 S. W. 1014 (1915);
Dixon v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co., 207 Mass. 126, 92 N. E. 1030 (1910) ; Donahoe
v. Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co., 83 Mo. 560, 53 Am. Rep. 594 (1884);
Woodward v. Gray, 46 Ohio App. 177, 188 N. E. 304 (1933); Shultz et al. v.
Dallas Power & Light Co., 147 S.W. (2d) 914 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).

Supra, note 13.
Id. at 531, 175 S.W. at 1017.
" Supra, note 13.
'"* Alabama Power Co. v. Conine et al., 213 Ala. 228, 104 So. 535 (1925)
(When the party in danger created his own peril by grasping an energized wire,
no recovery was allowed the administratrix for the death of the "would be rescuer.") ; Saylor v. Parsons et al., 122 Iowa 679, 98 N. W. 500 (1904) (Plaintiff,
seeing that defendant had placed himself in a position of danger from the collapse
of a wall which he was taking down, went to the defendant's rescue and in so
doing was himself injured. No recovery was allowed.). But cf. Butler v. Jersey
',

Coast News Co., 109 N. J.L. 255, 160 Atl. 659 (1932) (Where defendant's truck
negligently driven, left the road and struck a power line pole causing the wire to
fall across the highway and pin the driver thereof beneath the truck, it was held

that plaintiff, a passer-by and user of the highway, could recover from the de-

fendant for injuries sustained from coming into contact with the electric wire in
going to the driver's assistance. The court stated that this case was not under
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tenor is presented by those cases where the "rescuer," by his own voluntary act, has induced the danger, due to the existence of which another
is placed in a perilous situation.s* In propounding this principle it
has been held that no recovery was permissible when the decedent went
upon a long, high trestle, encumbered with a small child, and was killed
in an attempt to remove the child from the path of an oncoming train,19.*
or where a mother was injured in attempting to aid her child, who had
become imperiled by a defective portion of the sidewalk, over which
the mother had knowingly led such child.20
As in all negligence cases, so in those preceded by the epithet "rescue," the breach of duty by the actor must be the proximate cause of
the ensuing &1amage, and, where the rescuer is injured, it must be the
act of the person whose negligence created the peril. 21 * The proposition is expounded in Lashley et al. v. Dawson2 2 as follows: "Where
there is a complete continuance and unbroken sequence between the act
complained of and the act finally resulting in the injury, so that the one
may be regarded by persons of ordinary judgment as the logical and
probable cause of the other, the former may be regarded as the proximate cause of the injury." Nor will the causal connection between
the defendant's negligent act and the injury resulting therefrom be
2
-deemed severed because the rescuer's act is deliberate and voluntary. 3
The proximate cause as to the rescued's peril is the proximate cause as
to the rescuer's injury.24 * The Texas Court has followed this rule
in the case of Wichita Falls Traction Co. v. Hibbs et al.25 There the
defendant's street car conductor had negligently set a smoking stove on
the "rescue doctrine," but that plaintiff was a user of the highway and as such
had the right to aid in removing an obstruction therefrom or assisting any one
who appeared to be in danger.). For a collection of authorities on this point and
a criticism of the case last cited, see Notes (1933) 13 B. U. L. Rxv. 371, (1932-33)
31 MicH. L. Rxv. 584.
is* Atl. & C. A. L. Ry. Co. v. Leach, 91 Ga. 419, 17 S. E. 619, 44 Am. St. Rep.
47 (1893); White v. Chicago, 120 Ill. App. 607 (1905) ; Brown v. Col. Amusement Co., 91 Mont. 174, 6 P. (2d) 874 (1932) (If the emergency is the culmination of a train of events set in motion by the negligent act of the party attempting
the rescue, there can be no recovery.); cf. Bond v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., 82 W. Va.
557, 96 S. E. 932, 5 A. L. R. 201 (1918).
1 , Atl. & C. A. L. Ry. Co. v. Leach, 91 Ga. 419, 17 S. E. 619, 44 Am. St. Rep.
47 (1893) (If recovery be allowed in such a case, it would be allowing the rescuer
to take advantage of his own wrong.).
2' White v. Chicago, 120 Ill. App. 607 (1905).
2 * Perpich v. Letonia Mining Co., 118 Minn. 508, 137 N. W. 12 (1912) (It is
so held, whether or not the rescuer owed a duty to the rescued or the careless
actor.).
22 162 Md. 549, 562, 160 Atl. 738, 743 (1932).
"Wagner v. International Ry. Co., 232 N. Y. 176, 133 N. E. 437, 19 A. L. R.
1 (1921).
a'* Gibney v. State, 137 N. Y. 1, 33 N. E. 142 (1893)
(Where a child fell
through the state's bridge into water below and the father plunged in after the
child resulting in both being drowned, it was held that the proximate cause of
both deaths was the unsafe condition of the bridge.).
Ir 211 S.W. 287 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919).
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the street in front of the plaintiff's residence, in proximity to where
plaintiff's daughter was playing. The child's clothing caught fire therefrom and she ran into the kitchen where her mother was working, and
the latter put out the fire with her hands, sustaining permanent injuries.
On the defendant's contention that plaintiff's injuries were too remote,
it was held that the injuries were the natural and probable consequence
of the negligent act, which should have been anticipated by a person of
ordinary prudence. 26 * On the basis of these decisions, could it be successfully contended that the plaintiff's alleged injury, in the principal
case, was the direct and proximate cause of the alleged negligence of
the defendant? Seemingly, to so hold would be to project "directness"
and "proximateness" into the shadowy confines of "remoteness." When
the plaintiff arrived at the scene of the accident, after having arisen
from his bed at home upon the apprehension that his ambulance was
the victim of the "crash," denoting a collision at a nearby intersection,
the active negligence of the defendant had come to rest. Would it not
be stretching the "reasonable man theory" to conclude that it should
have been anticipated that some benevolent deliverer some time after
the collision might come to grief because of the alleged parking of the
defendant's truck in this illegal manner?
Problems arise when the rescued, or imperiled person, is deemed
guilty of contributory negligence. Such antecedent negligence of the
person rescued is not imputable to the rescuer.27 Thus the negligent
defendant may not invoke the principle of subrogation as a test of the
rescuer's right to recover. This situation presents a question, which
the writer has been unable to find answered by the courts, to wit:
If the deliverer is not precluded from recovery where the producer of
the danger is negligent and the party placed in peril is guilty of contributory negligence, might it not be strongly argued, in a suit by the
rescuer against the originally negligent party, that the former would be
warranted in joining the rescued party as a party defendant or that the
defendant might enforce contribution, as in the case of joint tort-feasors ?
The case of Arnold v. Northern States Power Co. et al.28 bears on this
point, but is distinguishable in that the negligence of the power com!!a*Cf. De Mahy v. Morgan La. & T. R. Co., 45 La. Ann. 1329, 14 So. 61
(1893) (Where it was held that the railroad's "negligence" in not providing a
station at the point in question was too remote to be causally connected with the
plaintiff's injury in rescuing her child, who had fallen from the platform of a
train into a dangerous position.).
-"Pierce v. United Gas & Elec. Co., 161 Cal. 176, 118 Pac. 700 (1911) ; Hatch
v. Globe Laundry Co., 137 Me. 379, 171 Atl. 387 (1934); Norris v. Atl. Coast
Line Ry. Co., 152 N. C. 505, 67 S. E. 1017, 27 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1069 (1910);
Highland et al. v. Wilsonian Inv. Co., 171 Wash. 34, 17 P. (2d) 631 (1932);
Bond v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., 82 W. Va. 557, 96 S. E. 932, 5 A. L. R. 201 (1918).
For a further collection of authorities on this point see Note (1918) 5 A. L. R. 206.
2209 Minn. 551, 297 N. W. 182 (1941).
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pany produced no peril towards the person intended to be rescued.
There a motorist negligently ran into the power company's electric pole
carrying high tension wires, causing such wires to sag across part of
the highway. Upon being notified, some of the company's linemen
visited the scene, observed the surroundings, and were on notice of the
gathering crowd, but left the premises unguarded with the intention of
later returning. In the interim plaintiff's intestate, a motorist, observed
the plight of the motorist, who had negligently run into the company's
pole, and prepared to give assistance. The intestate contacted a sagging wire. Recovery was allowed against the rescued and the power
company. The argument propounding the joinder of the contributorily
negligent party would seemingly be both convincing and reasonable.
A striking analogous situation to that wherein the rescued is contributorily negligent is that in which a parent is contributorily negligent
in allowing a child non sui juris to be present in a known place of
danger. Although there is authority supporting the contrary holding,2 9
the better reasoned rule would seem to be that such parent will not be
precluded from recovery for injuries received in his attempted rescue
of the child.30 It is said in the Donahoe case31 that the contributory
negligence of the parent in permitting the child to be in a dangerous
position would not prevent a stranger from recovering damages for an
injury sustained in attempting its rescue, and that a parent, possessing
a much greater inclination to effect such deliverance, would also be
protected.
The Pennsylvania Court has given the rescuer his just due when
it said: "A rescuer.., ought not to hear from the law words of condemnation of his bravery, because he rushed into danger, to snatch
from it the life of a fellow creature imperiled by the negligence of another; but he should rather listen to words of approval, unless regretfully withheld on account of the unmistakable evidence of his rashness
and imprudence." 32 But despite these words of praise, upon the basis
of the cases and materials above discussed, it is submitted that the
recent Georgia case under discussion 33 presents an unreasonable extension of the "rescue doctrine," through an unwarranted projection of the
doctrine of "proximate cause." In the writer's research no decisions
permitting such an extension have been discovered, and it is hoped
that upon trial of this case on its merits this undesirable result will
JAMES G. HrDsoN, JR.
not be reached.
" De Mahy v. Morgan La. & T. R. & S. Co., 45 La. Ann. 1329, 14 So. 61
(1893).
'0Donahoe v. Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co., 83 Mo. 560, 53 Am. Rep. 594
3
1Ibid.
(1884).
Corbin v. City of Phila., 195 Pa. 461, 468, 54 At. 1070, 1072 (1900).
"Supra, note 1.

